1	Patricia Nazario			
2	12951 Romont Street Sylmar CA 91342			
3	Tel: 213.247.7390			
4	Plaintiff in propria persona			
5				
6	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA			
7	COUNTY OF I	OS ANGELES		
8	UNLIMITED J	URISDICTION		
9				
10	PATRICIA NAZARIO,	Case No.: BC 476321		
11	Plaintiff,	SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT		
12	VS.	1. Rescission under Sections 1689(b), 1691, 1692, and 1693 Civil Code;		
13	GREGORY ANDREW YATES, KEREN HAVA BAVILSKI, GREGORY A. YATES, A	2. Legal Malpractice; 3. Breach of Contract		
14	PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION dba Law Office of Gregory A. Yates, a California	4. Negligent Assignment & Supervision5. Constructive Fraud		
15	corporation, Paul Howard Ingels (formerly Doe 1), Paul Ingels & Associates, Inc., a California	6. Conversion and Accounting7. Breach of Fiduciary Duty		
16	Corporation (formerly Doe 2) and DOES 3 to 25, inclusive,	8. R.I.C.O 18 USC 1964		
17	Defendants.			
18	Detendants.			
19				
20	PLAINTIFF ALLEGES AS FOLLOWS	3 :		
21	1. Plaintiff Patricia Nazario	(hereinafter "Plaintiff"), is		
22	a resident of the County of Los	s Angeles and of the State of		
23	California.			
24	2. Defendant Gregory Andrew Ya	tes (hereinafter "Yates") is a		
25	resident of the County of Los	Angeles and of the State of		
$\begin{bmatrix} 25 \\ 26 \end{bmatrix}$	California who is licensed as a	an attorney by the California		
	State Bar under license number 63	3259.		
27				
28				

- 1 3. Defendant Keren Hava Bavilski (hereinafter "Bavilski") is 2 upon the information and belief of Plaintiff a resident of the
- 3 | County of Los Angeles and of the State of California.
- 4 | Bavilski is an attorney licensed to practice by the California
- 5 | State Bar Association, license number 201699. At all times
- 6 relevant herein, Plaintiff is informed and believes and
- 7 | thereon alleges that Bavilski was an employed as an attorney
- 8 | by Defendant Corporation.
- 9 | 4. Defendant Gregory A. Yates, a Professional Corporation
- 10 dba Law Office of Gregory A. Yates (hereinafter "Corporation")
- 11 | is upon the information and belief of Plaintiff, a California
- 12 | corporation in good standing headquartered within the County
- 13 of Los Angeles and the State of California.
- 14 | 5. Defendant Paul Howard Ingels (hereinafter "Ingels") is a
- 15 resident of the County of San Bernardino and the State of
- 16 | California. At all times relevant herein, Ingels was and is a
- 17 | licensed Private Investigator in the State of California and
- 18 | qualified manager of Paul Ingels & Associates, Inc., License
- 19 #24315 issued by the California Bureau of Security &
- 20 | Investigative Services. Said Defendant was formerly designated
- 21 | as Doe 1.
- 22 | 6. Defendant Paul Ingels & Associates, Inc. (hereinafter
- 23 | "Associates"), Private Investigator License #24315 issued by
- 24 | the California Bureau of Security & Investigative Services, is
- 25 | a California Corporation headquartered in the County of San
- 26 | Bernardino and the State of California. Said Defendant was
- 27 | formerly designated as Doe 2.

7.	De	fenda	nts	Does	3-25,	inclus	sive,	are	any	indivi	duals
and/d	or	enti	ties	whose	e true	e full	names	and	capa	acities	are
unkno	own	to	Plai	ntiff	or no	ot full	y knov	wn to	Pla	intiff,	who
elect	ts	to s	ue tl	nem by	the	fictitio	ous na	me of	Doe	until	such
time	as	she	can	amend	l this	pleadi	ng und	der tl	ne pr	ovisior	ns of
Sect	ion	474	of th	ne Cal	iforni	a Code o	of Civ	il Pro	ocedui	re.	

8. At all times relevant herein, Defendants Yates and Corporation are and were alter egos and Defendants Ingels and Associates are and were alter egos.

ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION Time line of Discovery of Facts Constituting Professional Negligence

<u>Discovery of Fraud, Embezzlement & Conversion</u> In Connection with Payment to Paul Ingels

9. On or about December 8 and December 20, 2010, Defendant Yates caused to be sent to Plaintiff an itemization of the purported disbursement of funds received from judgment for the Plaintiff in the underlying case, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC 377597. Included in that itemization was a notation of a purported payment for investigative services to Defendant Ingels for which Defendant Paul Ingels & Associates, Inc. had claimed to have billed for 5.4 hours of work at \$125.00 per hour, 94 miles @ 75¢ per mile, and nothing for expenses. At the time, Plaintiff had no reason to suspect that Defendant Ingels might never have actually performed any investigative services, but also had no knowledge of what services Ingels had purportedly performed on her behalf.

- 1 10. On or about January 10, 2011, Plaintiff finally received
- 2 the files and evidence of the underlying case which she had
- 3 | been requesting from Defendant Yates starting on or about
- 4 | July 7, 2010.
- 5 | 11. The files received from Defendant Yates by Plaintiff
- 6 consisted of seven (7) standard filing boxes that were
- 7 | generally unorganized and in disarray. Plaintiff
- 8 painstakingly searched through the materials from the
- 9 underlying case and discovered (a) no evidence that Defendants
- 10 | Yates, Bavilski, or anybody working at their behest had ever
- 11 | requested any services from Defendant Ingels, (b) no invoice
- 12 | for services from Defendant Ingels, and (c) no investigative
- 13 | work product from Defendant Ingels or anything else-- period
- 14 | associated with him, or any purported investigation.
- 15 | 12. On or about March 5, 2012, Plaintiff wrote to Ingels,
- 16 after receiving her files and after ascertaining that there
- 17 was no work product or other justification for what Defendant
- 18 | Yates had charged to her trust funds for Ingels' purported
- 19 | services. Defendant Ingels failed to respond to Plaintiff's
- 20 | inquiry until May 1, 2012, just a few days before a demurrer
- 21 | was scheduled to be heard in the matter herein, and asserted
- 22 | that he'd never worked on Plaintiff's underlying case and that
- 23 | he did not even know her name.
- $24 \parallel 13$. The day before the hearing set in the matter herein on a
- 25 | Demurrer made on behalf of Defendant Yates et al and following
- 26 | the filing of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint which
- 27 | asserted that [Paragraph 14(b) FAC]: "Fabricated investigative
- 28 | costs purportedly paid to Private Investigator Paul Ingels in

the amount of \$745.50 on or about April 25, 2008."

12. Defendant Ingels sent another letter belatedly claiming that he had in fact worked on Plaintiff's case and stating that he believed that his files on the matter were in storage.

13. After waiting a reasonable time for Defendant Ingels to retrieve his files and case work product, Plaintiff again wrote Defendant Ingels on or about June 7, 2012 asking him for his files. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff was legally entitled to these files as attorney work product under State Bar Ethics Opinion 1992-127 and pursuant to Section 624, Title 16, Division 7, Article 4 of the California Code of Regulations.

14. Defendant Ingels has made no response whatsoever to Plaintiffs June 7, 2012 letter demanding her files (if any do indeed exist).

<u>Discovery of Yates' Los Angeles Police Department</u> Disciplinary Proceedings Against Officer Jesse Reyes

15. On or about January 27, 2012 Plaintiff learned by independent research that an appellate court decision had overturned disciplinary proceedings against Officer Jesse Reyes, specifically directed by the Los Angeles Police Department Internal Affairs Division, and dismissed his physical attack on Plaintiff. At that time, Plaintiff learned —for the first time—that the disciplinary action had been favorably terminated as to Reyes in large part because Plaintiff had not known that the Internal Affairs Division had been unable to interview her, and that her lack of

participation in their initial investigation eliminated her as a witness against Reyes at all future stages of his disciplinary process.

16. Even prior to hiring Defendant Yates, Plaintiff had made it known to attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union that she wanted to cooperate with the Los Angeles Police Department internal investigation and ACLU attorneys wrote LAPD Internal Affairs advising of that fact. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the ACLU communicated this fact to the Los Angeles Police Department.

(Exhibit 1) When Defendant Yates was hired, Plaintiff made it unambiguously clear to him that she wanted to cooperate with the LAPD investigation to insure that disciplinary action would be taken against the officer who attacked her, who was later identified as Officer Jesse Reyes of the Metropolitan Division of the Los Angeles Police Department.

17. On or about June 7, 2012 Plaintiff wrote to the Los Angeles Police Department in an attempt to ascertain why she had never been interviewed by the Internal Affairs Division and was not notified to testify at Officer Reyes' Board of Rights hearing. Plaintiff learned that Mario Noriega, a media cameraman who had also been battered by Officer Reyes had been interviewed by Internal Affairs and subsequently testified at Reyes' Board of Rights hearing. Consequently, disciplinary charges against Reyes for his attack on Noriega were upheld.

18. On or about July 17, 2012 Plaintiff spoke telephonically with Sgt. Brad Wise of the LAPD Risk Management Division who told Plaintiff that the six-week delay to respond to her

letter was due to the labor involved in attempting to retrieve their 2007 MayDay Melee files from archives to research her inquiry into the Officer Jesse Reyes matter. Sgt. Wise, only a few days prior, had located a letter in the file which documented the Internal Affairs Division's attempts to contact her through her attorney, Defendant Yates.

19. On or about July 19, 2012, Plaintiff initiated a subpoena duces tecum to the Los Angeles Police Department which resulted in production of Exhibit 2 on or about August 10, 2012. Exhibit 2 demonstrates that the Los Angeles Police Department documented on August 15, 2007 its diligent and repeated attempts to contact Plaintiff and other clients of Yates in connection with its investigation of the underlying case incident. At all times relevant herein, Defendant Yates concealed from Plaintiff (and upon information and belief of Plaintiff, from another client who had adamantly and repeatedly insisted to Yates that he also wanted to seek disciplinary action against the LAPD officer who shot him and wanted to cooperate with the Los Angeles Police Department) each and every attempt by the LAPD Internal Affairs Division to interview Plaintiff.

20. Plaintiff could not have possibly known that Defendants had concealed these facts from Plaintiff because neither Exhibit 2 nor any other notes, memoranda, or any documentation whatsoever were contained in the files and evidence that she received from Defendant Yates.

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21. By failing to notify Plaintiff of the LAPD's attempts to contact and interview Plaintiff, Defendants violated the California State Bar Association Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC), Rule 3-500. 22. By failing, from July 2010 until January 2011 to return Plaintiff's client papers and property including, but not limited to correspondence, pleadings, deposition transcripts, exhibits, physical evidence, expert's reports, and other items reasonably necessary to the representation of Plaintiff, Defendants intentionally violated RPC 3-700(D) and State Bar Ethics Opinion 1992-127 in an effort to excise from the files; conceal evidence of their malfeasance and negligence; reduce the amount of time Plaintiff would have to execute meaningful discovery and file a timely malpractice civil complaint.

1	23. By failing to notify Plaintiff (and at least one other
2	client) of the LAPD's efforts to contact and interview them,
3	the Defendants further harmed Plaintiff's interests by
4	allowing Officer Jesse Reyes to escape disciplinary action, by
5	enabling the publication on the internet the California Court
6	of Appeals decision in Reyes' case which disparages
7	Plaintiff's reputation by casting her conduct in a false
8	light, discredits her educational level, and denigrates her
9	ability to speak grammatically-correct English. Because this
10	is a privileged document under Section 47 of the California
11	Civil Code, any civil action for defamation of character
12	against Officer Reyes is impossible. Therefore, Plaintiff
13	must suffer all negative social and professional consequences
14	of said defamation. (EXHIBIT 16)

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24. Defendants' negligence further enabled Reyes to perjure 15 || himself with impunity both in deposition and trial in the underlying action and squandered a potential incentive Reyes and the City of Los Angeles to want to settle the underlying civil action against him on terms more favorable to the Plaintiff.

Defendant's other client says that justice was not served his case either, because said client was unable to participate in the identification process of the officer who shot him, and who was never identified, nor disciplined.

Time Line of Plaintiff's Attempts to Obtain her Client Files and Evidence

26. On or about Wed, Jul 7, 2010 at 6:29 PM Plaintiff emailed Defendant Yates and indicated to him "I know you're busy on

- 1 another trial, so I'll make it quick. I'd like to request my
- 2 | case file from your office. I'm planning to write about the
- 3 | experience in one form or another and having these archives
- 4 | will come in handy. There are some things I already have that
- 5 | don't need to be duplicated:
- 6 | *Reyes deposition
- 7 | *Vuong deposition
- 8 | *Nazario deposition
- 9 | *Ex 504 color photos
- 10 | *The Exhibit of the items that were inside my backpack
- 11 | (digital recorder, microphone, etc.)
- 12 | I'd like to have everything else, including the jury
- 13 | instructions. I also need that NAHJ DVD (the panel discussion
- 14 | with Bratton).
- 15 | What about Reyes' videotaped depo? Is that considered public
- 16 domain and usable outside of the courtroom setting? If so,
- 17 | can I borrow it long enough to make a duplicate? I'd may as
- 18 | well dub Dr. Tomaszewski's as well. Would you also please
- 19 | share any info you have on the jurors? I know you said you're
- 20 | going to follow up with Daisey Flores and Mr. Walker. Please
- 21 give me their cell phone numbers as well."
- 22 | Please let me know when I can pick these things up, as well as
- 23 || leave you Carol Sobel's external hard drive." (EXHIBIT 3)
- 24 | 27. On or about the evening of July 7, 2010, Defendant Yates
- 25 | responded by email that he was in another trial and that he
- 26 | would get a service to make copies. He also said that, "I am
- 27 | also trying to contact some of the jurors to see if the judge
- 28 | will add to your award. That is already in process. I will

- 1 | keep you posted." (EXHIBIT 3)
- 2 | 28. A couple of weeks later, Plaintiff updated her request by
- 3 email on Fri, Jul 23, 2010 at 4:14 PM, stating: "Hi Greg,
- 4 | Thanks for the note. I can be patient for the bulk of my
- 5 | request, but I do hope to get the following things in the
- 6 | immediate future:
- 7 | 1) the NAHJ DVD
- $8 \parallel 2$) jury instructions
- 9 | 3) contact info for Daisy Flores and Mr. Walker
- 10 | Please let me know at your earliest convenience when you can
- 11 | mail them out." (EXHIBIT 3)
- 12 | 29. Defendant Yates response on or about July 24, the next day,
- 13 | included: Sat, Jul 24, 2010 at 11:24 AM "I can get you both
- $14 \parallel \text{items 1})$ and 2) by early next week. I will get you the NAHJ DVD
- 15 and a copy of the jury instructions..." (EXHIBIT 3)
- 16 30. Four-and-a-half months passed while Plaintiff heard
- 17 | nothing from Defendants at all. Plaintiff re-initiated email
- 18 contact with him in early December 2010 to inquire about
- 19 | pending post-trial motions. In January 2011, Plaintiff
- 20 | requested her files, again, for the second time. Six months
- 21 | had passed since Plaintiff's first request. In that January
- 22 | email, Plaintiff insisted that she wanted to pick it up in one
- 23 | week and attached a formal letter: Email example:
- 24 | Mon, Jan 3, 2011 at 8:25 AM "As you may recall, on July 7,
- 25 | 2010, I requested my case file from your office, in your email
- 26 | response that same evening, you asked me to be patient because
- 27 | you were on trial and that you would get a service to do it.

- 1 | That was about six months ago. As you know, California State Bar
- 2 | Ethics Opinion 475 and 330 (November 30, 1972) obliges civil
- 3 attorneys to release archives to clients. That same opinion
- 4 allows a five-year window to resolve the issue in civil matters.
- 5 | I've patiently waited seven months. I'm willing to wait one more
- 6 week for your office to deliver my entire file to me. Please
- 7 | advise when/where I can pick it up." (EXHIBIT 4)
- 8 31. Mon, Jan 3, 2011 at 11:49 AM (From Defendant Yates) "Since
- 9 | I have heard nothing from you since my last email to you of July
- $10 \parallel 24$, I will deem your letter of today as your request that I copy
- 11 the file and release it to you." (EXHIBIT 4)
- 12 | 32. Defendant Yates alluded to covering the expense of
- 13 | copying certain elements in my file unless, "...you need more
- 14 | than the above, in which case you will have to bear the
- 15 || expense."
- 16 | 33. Plaintiff responded by citing State Bar Ethics Opinion
- 17 | 1992-127, Footnote Number 3. Plaintiff reminded Defendant
- 18 | Yates that Plaintiff was requesting the originals, not
- 19 copies, and that there was no clause in the contract providing
- 20 | that he could recoup the costs of copying these files for his
- 21 | own purposes and that if he wished to do so, it would be at
- 22 | his own expense.
- 23 | 34. Defendant Yates finally consented to Plaintiff's request on
- 24 | January 5, 2011. Plaintiff picked up the original case file
- 25 | on January 10, 2011. (EXHIBIT 5)
- $26 \parallel 35$. Defendant Yates' overt acts to complicate the process of
- 27 | Plaintiff retrieving her files were unwarranted and

intentionally designed to delay while those files were sanitized of evidence, such as the LAPD Internal Affairs heretofore discussed, of his malfeasance, and negligence. Defendant Yates intentionally tried to make Plaintiff pay for the voluminous archives, ignoring the well-established State Bar Ethics Opinion, 1992-127 that Plaintiff later cited. Defendant Yates promised to "...keep me posted," about pending judgments on post-trial motions in exchanged emails in July 2010 as an intentional "lulling tactic" to conceal the Defendants' malfeasance and negligence. Failing to do that, Yates then asserted that he was going to advance the time stamp of Plaintiff's initial request, because he hadn't heard from me since July.

<u>Defendants' Concealment of Failure to</u> Investigate Officer Jesse Reyes' Background

36. On or about Sun, May 16, 2010 at 9:48 PM Plaintiff emailed to Defendant Yates information she had received from a private investigator friend who she had asked to find information about Officer Jesse Reyes: "It's urgent that we talk about investigating Reyes. In a basic preliminary search, his name came up in 2 different criminal cases Sheriff Pitchess motions. I have case names. Allegations range from lying and dishonesty to false arrest and fabricating probable cause. It looks like we have a dirty cop here... I want you to send me section 2 of his Form Interrogatories. I will pass it on to my investigator friend. We have two weeks to come up with witnesses would could impeach his credibility in rebuttal." (EXHIBIT 6)

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- 1 | 37. On or about Sun, May 16, 2010 at 10:31 PM Plaintiff again
- 2 | e-mailed Defendant Yates, stating, "Both criminal cases are
- 3 | unpublished opinions of the CA Court of Appeals and came up
- 4 | under a simple search. Case one from January, 2010 names
- 5 | Jesse Reyes and his partner, Scott Coffey:
- 6 | People vs. Jiaro Hernandez case# B211197
- 7 | LA Superior Court TA094405 (Compton area?)
- 8 | *The Pitchess motion include allegations of dishonestly, false
- 9 | arrest, fabricating probable cause and similar acts, false
- 10 | reports and planting evidence.
- 11 | *Notice the date. If the DA didn't disclose our lawsuit
- 12 | against Reyes to Hernandez's attorney, this could be Brady
- 13 | material.
- 14 | Case two from January, 2004 names Reyes and an officer
- 15 | Roblato (?)
- 16 | People vs. Sylvester Laverette
- 17 | Judge Lance Ido
- 18 Unpublished decision from 2/2/2006
- 19 | *The Pitchess motion here include false identity and false
- 20 || statements.
- 21 | *The disclosed info included 8 different complaints." (EXHIBIT
- 22 | 7)
- 23 | 38. In a telephonic conversation, Defendant Yates told
- 24 | Plaintiff that he already knew about these two cases.
- 25 Defendant Yates then wrote Plaintiff two days later and
- 26 | avoided responding to the issues that Plaintiff raised about
- 27 the Pitchess motions. Instead, he directed Plaintiff's
- 28 | attention to her trial testimony and asked Plaintiff to help

craft an opening statement.

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39. At no time did Plaintiff have any reason to suspect that Defendant Yates might have, at that time, lied to her about his knowledge of Reyes' background. By his claiming to already know about the Pitchess motions and non-responsive posture in subsequent emails, Defendant Yates also lead Plaintiff to believe that he had, in fact, conducted discovery by serving Officer Reyes with Form Interrogatories. No such discovery was discovered in Plaintiff's case file.

40. Only upon receipt and review of Plaintiff's files, and other writings as defined in Evidence Code Section 250 following January 10, 2012, did Plaintiff learn that there was nothing in the files indicating any knowledge -whatsoever- or any research, or investigative work-product concerning the aforementioned prior disciplinary acts of Officer Jesse Reyes. Plaintiff was also unable to locate, in any of the files, any Defendants evidence that had propounded ever any interrogatories or requests for admissions on Jesse Reyes and/or the City of Los Angeles.

Evidence and Information Removed from Plaintiff's Files

41. Only after January 10, 2012 and continuing thereafter did Plaintiff learn that the following evidence and information had either been removed from Plaintiff's files by the Defendants or had been represented to exist by the Defendants but did not exist: (a) any and all evidence that the Los Angeles Police Department Internal Affairs Division had contacted Defendants in an attempt to secure the cooperation of Plaintiff for the its investigation of Officer Jesse Reyes;

1	(b) any and all evidence of the participation of Private
2	Investigator Ken Shigut, California Private Investigator
3	License #140841, (c) any and all evidence of the purported
4	participation of Private Investigator Paul Ingels in the case;
5	(d) any and all evidence that interrogatories and/or requests
6	for admission were ever propounded in the underlying case by
7	the Defendants; (e) any evidence with the exception of a
8	single copy of the "Shield Law" itself indicating that
9	Defendants had reviewed any case law in connection with
10	controversies and motions about the application of the
11	journalists' shield laws; (f) no evidence of Plaintiff's lost
12	wages; (g) Plaintiff's live radio reports from Plaintiff's on-
13	air reporting on May 1, 2007 at MacArthur Park; (h) the
14	handwritten notes of Plaintiff's supervisor that she had taken
15	while on the telephone with Plaintiff at the time of her being
16	physically attacked by Officer Jesse Reyes; (i) no records of
17	any multi-media (i.e. an audio/video forensic expert)

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

examination of the audio/video evidence.

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FOR RESCISSION

AGAINST DEFENDANT YATES, CORPORATION AND DOES 3-8, INCLUSIVE

- 42. Within the First Cause of Action for Rescission, Plaintiff reincorporated and re-alleges as though fully set forth herein each and every allegation contained within the preceding paragraphs 1-41, inclusive.
- On or about June 22, 2007, Plaintiff entered into a contract for legal representation with the Defendants which was pre-dated by

and which Plaintiff did not become cognizant of until the drafting of the initial Complaint. The contract is attached hereto as (EXHIBIT 8) and incorporated herein by reference. 43. Prior to entering into the above-mentioned contractual agreement, Defendant Yates made representations about competence, experience, results of his services, his intentions on how he would conduct the investigation and litigation of Plaintiff's case and abilities which he knew to be untrue or which he had no reasonable basis for believing to be true, in order to induce Plaintiff to enter into the is informed and believes and thereon agreement. Plaintiff alleges that the reasons (which Plaintiff did not discover until on or about November 2011 through January 2012) why Defendant Yates knew his representations to be untrue include, but are not limited to: (a) in 1986, California Association Case No. 840218 LA, Defendant Yates took advances of \$2,500.00 from a client and failed to maintain the money in a segregated trust account, no individual ledger, and no accounting procedure to segregate the funds received, negotiated and received a settlement of \$4,500, failed to deposit the funds into a trust account, and wrote a check made payable to cash in the amount of \$10,390.00 without any adequate accounting of the nature of the expenses or their relation to his client; Yates also in this matter settled some clients cases in order to provide a purported "war chest" for the remainder of prosecution of the case and then converted the entire sum to himself purportedly to cover costs and fees leaving no recovery for his client;

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- (c) in Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC 139521 Famco FCU vs Louis G. Harbottle et al exposed the fact that Defendant Yates supervised his law practice so ineptly that his bookkeeper managed to embezzle \$11,547.62 over the course of nearly two years;
- in 2000, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. SC 064055, (d) Taschner vs Yates et al, it was alleged that Defendant Yates surreptitiously settled the "Rampart Division" litigation against the City of Los Angeles for an excess of \$10,000,000 and then failed and refused to pay co-counsel Taschner for his share of the settlement as agreed to (e.g. approximately \$900,000);
- (e) in 2008, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. LC 081111, Vensel vs Yates et al, Plaintiff Vensel alleged that Defendant Yates committed legal malpractice and Yates settled the matter for a payment of \$100,000 and was required to pay the cost of the mediator under the settlement while he was representing Plaintiff and failed to apprise Plaintiff of this ongoing matter and/or that the behavior that led to this suit was the same and/or similar behavior that he was engaging in with his representation of Plaintiff;
- (f) in 2001, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BS 069034, Moreno et al vs Law Office of Gregory A. Yates, the Plaintiffs, attorneys, petitioned to compel binding arbitration against Yates over an attorney fee lien dispute;

- (h) in 1991, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC 044652, Rubin vs Yates, the Plaintiff sued Yates for assault and battery and related injuries, contending that in essence, following a traffic accident that Defendant Yates exercised little or no impulse control and screamed at Rubin using a homophobic epithet ("fucking faggot") and physically hit Rubin about his head while Rubin was seated inside his car.
- 45. At all times relevant herein, had Plaintiff known of the facts enumerated in paragraph 44, Plaintiff would never have entered into a contractual relationship with Defendants for legal services or for any services whatsoever.
- 46. The underlying litigation for which Plaintiff hired the Defendants involved her having been physically attacked by a Los Angeles Police Officer at MacArthur Park in Los Angeles on May

 1, 2007 while working as a reporter for KPCC (Southern

California Public Radio). It was a well publicized incident.

47. At all times relevant herein and especially at the time she entered into the aforementioned agreement, Plaintiff was suffering from neurological injuries and trauma to her brain as a proximate result of the underlying subject matter of her need for legal representation and these facts were known to Defendant Yates, who in addition to fraudulently misrepresenting his qualifications to handle the litigation, also used undue

- limited to migraine headaches, sudden dizziness, word finding problems, continuing loss of short term memory [See Exhibit 9].
- 3 48. Plaintiff is informed (only learning these facts on or about May 1, 2012) and believes and thereon alleges that 5 Defendants either:

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- (a) Withheld all writings as defined in Evidence Code Section 250 concerning investigative assignments, results of investigation, invoice for investigation and investigative work product directed to and obtained from Private Investigator Paul Ingels to which Plaintiff is entitled to receive from the Defendants pursuant to State Bar Ethics Opinion 1992-127 or;
- (b) Fabricated investigative costs purportedly paid to Private Investigator Paul Ingels in the amount of \$745.50 on or about April 25, 2008.
- 49. On or about May 9, 2010, Defendant Yates told Plaintiff that out of sympathy for a client(turned friend) he came to MacArthur Park with, who Yates indicated had been framed in the "Ramparts" scandal of the LAPD and spent time in prison, that Yates had arranged for two (2) of the client's children to file false claims that they had been in MacArthur Park on May 1, 2007 and that they were beaten by the LAPD so that they could recover fraudulent settlements from the City of Los Angeles in a class action lawsuit. At all times relevant herein, Defendant Yates knew or should have known that these interests were adverse or potentially adverse to the interests of Plaintiff pursuant to RPC 3-300 and 3-310. Defendants' representation of Plaintiff children of Defendant Yates and the other client/friend simultaneously was at all times relevant herein grounds for

their mandatory withdrawal from representation pursuant to RPC 3-700(B)(2) because such representation was inherently in conflict with RPC 3-300 and 3-310.

50. Clause VIII of the aforementioned agreement (**EXHIBIT 8**) does not prohibit Plaintiff from initiating an action for Rescission of the agreement itself, wherein Plaintiff elects to sue for revision of Clause VIII in and of itself as having been entered into by fraud and/or undue influence as defined in Section 1689 of the California Civil Code.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

LEGAL MALPRACTICE

AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

51. Within the Second Cause of Action for Legal Malpractice, Plaintiff reincorporates and re-alleges as though fully set forth herein each and every allegation contained within the preceding paragraphs 1-50, inclusive.

52. On or about June 22, 2007, Plaintiff and Defendants Yates and Corporation entered into the agreement attached hereto as (EXHIBIT 8), by which and pursuant to Defendants agreed to and were legally obligated to perform legal services skillfully, prudently, diligently for her, and at least according to the standard of care required of other such professionals in the community. Said Defendants represented Plaintiff at her June 2010 trial (Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC 377597), in which the court awarded the defendant (City of L.A.) costs in the amount of \$9,302.00 and Defendant Yates converted the entire remaining \$30,141.00 for his costs and fees, leaving no recovery for Plaintiff.

- 1 53. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that 2 each of said Defendants continued to perform such services for 3 and on her behalf until at least October 29, 2010.
- 4 54. At no time did Defendant Yates inform Plaintiff that he was litigating a Motion to Tax Costs on her behalf or the outcome of that Motion on October 29, 2010, and in spite of her repeated requests starting July 2010 (shortly after trial) to receive the files and evidence from her underlying litigation (Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC 377597), Plaintiff did not receive
- 10 | them until January 10, 2011.

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- 55. Only after receiving her files and records on or January 10, 2011 (with the exception of writings as defined in Evidence Code Section 250 that have been withheld from Plaintiff by Defendants as set forth in Paragraphs 35-40 inclusive) from Defendants did Plaintiff discover many of the facts Defendants' negligence in handling her case and only thereafter, through independent investigation and research did Plaintiff learn of the Defendants' patterns and practices as set forth in paragraph 43, above. Plaintiff's probing and examination into these matters was impeded by the withholding of documents and/or evidence which Defendants claimed to be subject to a protective order and by the fact that Defendants delivered Plaintiff's files organized, sorted, chronological in no or order whatsoever.
- 56. At all times relevant herein Defendants, and each of them, held themselves out to Plaintiff as having specialized knowledge, skill, experience and expertise in civil law, the litigation of police misconduct, civil rights cases involving

use of force and corruption, related health care injury law, and aptitude, other professional insight, competence and proficiency, and agreed to utilize such knowledge, skill, and expertise in performing experience services for the Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not learn the facts concerning Defendants' ineptitude concerning related health care injury law and other aspects of civil litigation until on or about November 2011-January 2012.

- 57. Plaintiff relied upon, and followed, the advice rendered to her by Defendants, and each of them, so long as they, and each of them, represented her, in consequence thereof, plaintiff suffered the injuries and damages hereinafter alleged. Plaintiff so acted only at the advice of each of said Defendants, and would not have so acted without such advice.
- 58. As a direct and proximate result of said acts and conduct of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff's case was not adequately prepared for jury trial causing Plaintiff to suffer substantial loss of her property rights, including, but not limited to, her claims for Civil Rights violations, pain and suffering, emotional distress, claims for future medical treatment, recovery of medical expenses and lost wages, all to her damage in a sum in excess of the minimum jurisdiction of this Court.
- 59. The acts and omissions of the Defendants (which Plaintiff learned of on or about November 2011-January 2012) and each of them, which were the proximate causes of damage to her interests, legal and otherwise, include but are not limited to:

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- Failing to research case law concerning the objection by Plaintiff's employer to a subpoena for the testimony Plaintiff's supervisor;
- Erroneously accepting the assertion of counsel for (b) that the Plaintiff's employer California "Shield Law" encompassed in Section 1070 of the California Evidence Code and Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution was an absolute "privilege" when in plainly established case law the Shield Law has been ruled not to even constitute a "privilege;"
- Failing to oppose or object to the improper assertion of (C) the Shield Law by Plaintiff's employer and failing to assert that Plaintiff's rights under Article I, Section 2(a) of the California Constitution should take precedence employer's purported rights under Article I, Section 2(b) of the California Constitution;
- By Defendant Bavilski failing to even discuss the facts of the case with Plaintiff when "researching" the application or non-application of the Shield Law to the case;
- Failing to file a joinder in other Plaintiffs' Pitchess Motion to seek release of defendant misconduct allegations against the police officer who had assaulted and battered Plaintiff;
- Selecting an "expert witness" who Defendant Yates knew, or should have known, would be unable to qualify to testify about his work product to insure its admissibility in court;
- Failing to employ an investigator to research the of Plaintiffs' assailant while background representing Plaintiff that he already knew facts about that assailant which

Plaintiff told him about [which are nowhere reflected in the case file documents as turned over to Plaintiff on January 10, 2011] which Plaintiff had learned about prior to trial from another licensed investigator and failing to research the facts concerning Plaintiff's assailant's own lawsuit against the City of Los Angeles, the existence of which Plaintiff did not discover until January 27, 2012;

- (h) Failing to question Plaintiff's assailant in deposition concerning his past incidents of misconduct involving his credibility and honesty [which Plaintiff subsequently learned about after the deposition from a licensed private investigator who had not been employed by Defendants] or about the case of Reyes vs Los Angeles;
- (i) Failing to timely submit exhibits concerning Plaintiff's damages causing them not to be admitted at trial causing Plaintiff to be forced to attempt to memorize information concerning her damages for direct testimony, knowing part of Plaintiff's damages were in fact neurological impairment of her ability to remember;
- (j) Failing to plead violations of the Ralph Civil Rights Act and Bane Civil Rights Act as separate causes of action in the Complaint as separate remedies that are expressly available as exclusive of all other remedies;
- (k) Failing to properly plead damages to include minimum civil penalties of \$25,000.00 each as to the Ralph and Bane civil rights acts;
- (1) Failing to plead violations of Plaintiff's rights under (I) Article I, Sections 1, 2, 3, and 7 of the California

Constitution and (II) Sections 43 and 52.3 of the California Civil Code;

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- (m) Failing to make other timely objections or any objections to (I) adoption of the verdict form and jury instructions, (II) the special verdict form, and (III) the nature and form of the Special Jury Instruction regarding Cheryl Devall's invocation of the purported "privilege" under Section 1070 of the California failing object the court's Evidence Code, (IV) to to characterization of the Shield Law as a "privilege" in the court's ruling on or about August 31, 2010 on a motion for JNOV (Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict);
- (n) Failing to attempt to compromise expense claims according to common custom and practice of civil plaintiffs' lawyers to insure at least some portion of the judgment would actually be remitted to Plaintiff.
- (o) By Defendant Yates and Defendant Corporation negligently assigning and supervising Defendant Bavilski's research of the legal implications of Plaintiff's employer's objection to the subpoena issued for the attendance of Cheryl Devall as a trial witness.
- (p) By failing to maintain appropriate contact with Plaintiff's treating physician, Robert J. Tomaszewski, PH.D. (EXHIBIT 9).
- (q) By Defendant Yates advising Plaintiff to reject a \$75,000.00 settlement offer during trial and falsely advising Plaintiff that the offer would still be, "...on the table," after she testified.
- 60. The aforementioned acts and omissions were done by the Defendants, and each of them, in breach of their duties to the

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1	Plaintiff by negligently, carelessly, and recklessly failing to
2	exercise reasonable care and skill in undertaking to perform,
3	and performing, legal services for Plaintiff and negligently,
4	carelessly and recklessly investigated, researched, analyzed and
5	presented Plaintiff's case.
6	61. But for the actions and omissions of the Defendants, and

61. But for the actions and omissions of the Defendants, and each of them, in their improper handling of the plaintiff's personal injury claim, she would have been able to prevail upon her claims and to vindicate her legal, civil, and constitutional rights.

- 62. Plaintiff relied upon and followed the advice rendered to her by Defendants, and each of them, so long as they represented her, in consequence thereof, Plaintiff suffered the injuries and damages alleged herein. Plaintiff so acted only at the advice of each of said Defendants and would not have so acted without such advice.
- 63. Plaintiff has been generally and specially damaged in an amount to be determined at trial on the issues herein, and whereas Defendants' acts and omissions were grossly negligent, done fraudulently, and with a malicious disregard of her rights, Plaintiff is entitled to recover of them punitive and exemplary damages according to proof at trial.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

BREACH OF CONTRACT

Against Defendants Yates, Corporation, and Does 3-8, inclusive 64. Within the Third Cause of Action for Breach of Contract Plaintiff reincorporates and re-alleges as though fully set forth herein each and every allegation contained within the

27	Against Defendants Yates, Corporation and Does 3-8 inclusive
26	NEGLIGENT ASSIGNMENT AND SUPERVISION
25	FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
24	trial.
23	Defendants punitive and exemplary damages according to proof at
22	violation of public policy, Plaintiff is entitled to recover or
21	complained of herein were malicious, fraudulent, and done in
20	and Corporation. Wherein, Defendants' acts and omissions
.9	proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendants Yates
.8	amount to be determined at trial on the issues herein as a
.7	68. Plaintiff has been generally and specially damaged in ar
.6	506 of the California Penal Code.
.5	and embezzling funds due to Plaintiff in violation of Section
.4	and reckless manner as set forth hereinabove and by converting
.3	Plaintiff by performing their services in a negligent, careless,
.2	67. Defendants, and each of them, breached said contract with
.1	excused from performing.
.0	perform, except those obligations Plaintiff was prevented or
9	promises and covenants which the agreement required her to
8	66. Plaintiff has duly performed all of the conditions,
7	fees, costs and expenses to the Defendants for their services.
6	Plaintiff agreed to pay, on her behalf, reasonable attorneys
5	competently and free from negligence, or other fault, and
4	Corporation agreed to represent Plaintiff's interests
3	incorporated herein by reference, Defendants Yates and
2	65. Pursuant to the agreement alleged in Exhibit 8 and
1	preceding paragraphs 1-63, inclusive.

- 1 69. Within the Fourth Cause of Action for Negligent Assignment 2 and Supervision, Plaintiff reincorporates and re-alleges by 3 reference each and every allegation contained within the 4 preceding paragraphs 1-68 inclusive as though fully set forth
- 5 | herein.
- 6 70. Plaintiff is informed (and only learned after receiving her
- 7 | file on or about January 10, 2011) and believes and thereon
- 8 | alleges that Defendants Yates and Corporation assigned Defendant
- 9 Bavilski to research the legal issues involving the California
- 10 | Shield Law doctrine invoked by Plaintiff's employer in objection
- 11 to a subpoena duly served on witness Cheryl Devall. Plaintiff is
- 12 | further informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant
- 13 | Bavilski's sole research was to read and print out a copy of
- 14 | Section 1070 of the California Evidence Code eight days before
- 15 | trial start date. (EXHIBIT 10)
- $16 \parallel 71$. Thereafter, Defendants Yates and Corporation failed to
- 17 | supervise and direct Defendant Bavilski to review case law
- 18 | interpreting Section 1070 of the California Evidence Code and
- 19 | Article I, Section 2(b) of the California Constitution to make a
- 20 proper determination as to whether the laws cited in support of
- 21 | Plaintiff's employer's objection were even applicable to the
- 22 | facts of Plaintiff's case. Additionally Defendants Yates and
- 23 || Corporation failed to supervise and direct Defendant Bavilski to
- 24 discuss the facts of the case pertaining to the Shield Law
- 25 | objection with Plaintiff.
- $26 \parallel 72$. Had Defendants Yates and Corporation properly assigned and
- 27 | supervised Defendant Bavilski, it would have been determined
- 28 | that the legal contention that the relevant laws created a

1	"privilege" was frivolous on its face, that the issue had been
2	repeatedly determined with cases on point to clearly distinguish
3	that no such privilege existed and that the word "privilege" is
4	nowhere mentioned in the relevant statutes and Constitutional
5	provisions.
6	73. Had Defendants Yates and Corporation properly assigned and
7	supervised Defendant Bavilski, it would have been determined
8	that the legal contention that the relevant laws created any
9	reasonable objection to the subpoena for Cheryl Devall was
10	frivolous on its face, that the actual facts of what she would
11	have testified to were not the subject matter of the statutory
12	and/or constitutional immunity that the law actually
13	contemplates, and that even assuming arguendo that the facts of
14	the case actually had anything to do with the subject matter of
15	the statutory scheme, that the Plaintiff's California
16	constitutional rights, which were at issue in the underlying
17	matter, presented a case of first impression as to whether the

74. Plaintiff has been generally and specially damaged in an amount to be determined at trial on the issues herein as a proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendants Yates and Corporation.

immunity conferred by the Shield Law outweighed Plaintiff's

state constitutional rights.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Constructive Fraud

Against Defendants Yates, Corporation and Does 1-5 inclusive

75. Within the Fifth Cause of Action for Constructive Fraud

- Plaintiff reincorporates and re-alleges as though fully set forth herein each and every allegation contained within the
- 4 76. Prior to undertaking the representation of Plaintiff
- 5 Defendant Yates acting on behalf of himself and Defendant
- 6 | Corporation made representations to Plaintiff as set forth in

preceding paragraphs 1-74, inclusive.

7 | paragraph 11, above.

- 8 77. At all times relevant herein, Defendant Yates knew that the
- 9 | representations he made to Plaintiff were untrue and that the
- 10 | truth is as represented above in paragraph 10 of this Complaint.
- 11 Defendant Yates concealed the facts alleged in paragraph 44 by
- 12 | telling Plaintiff falsehoods concerning his background,
- 13 | comprehension level of head injuries, and intentions for the
- 14 | handling of Plaintiff's case with the intent to defraud
- 15 | Plaintiff by allowing him to entrust her legal, constitutional,
- 16 and other interests in his care.
- 17 | 78. In justifiable reliance upon Defendants' representations as
- 18 | heretofore set forth, Plaintiff hired and employed Defendants to
- 19 represent her legal interests and did not terminate the
- 20 | Defendants' services believing them to be in her best legal
- 21 Hinterests.
- 22 | 79. During and throughout his representation of Plaintiff,
- 23 | Defendant Yates, acting for himself and for Defendant
- 24 | Corporation, made a series of false representations to Plaintiff
- 25 | which he either knew to be false or which he had no reasonable
- 26 | basis for believing or asserting, including but not limited to
- 27 | that California's Shield Law created an "absolute privilege" for
- 28 | Cheryl Devall not to testify --when in fact, no such "privilege"

1 exists in case law-- and that there was thus, no way to oppose 2 Plaintiff's employer's objection to the subpoena for Cheryl Devall. 3 80. Plaintiff discovered on or about May 1, 2012 that Defendants 4 have either withheld evidence and/or fabricated false cost 5 charges concerning an alleged investigation conducted by Private 6 7 Investigator Paul Ingels as set forth in paragraphs 11 - 14, inclusive. (EXHIBIT 11) 8 9 81. On or about February 21, 2012 Defendant Yates failed and 10 refused to respond to a series of questions regarding his conduct and that of his office in representing Plaintiff in the 11 12 underlying case, only claiming that Defendant Yates 13 "discussed each course of action with" Plaintiff specifying what "each" was referring to. (EXHIBITS 12 & 13) 14 Plaintiff infers that Defendant Yates meant 15 to say that 16 Plaintiff was fully informed about a series of issues that she 17 outlined in a letter to Defendant Yates on or about February 8, 18 2012 (EXHIBIT 12) At all times relevant herein, Defendant knew 19 or should have known that he had not "fully informed" Plaintiff concerning the facts alleged herein in paragraphs 10-24, 20 21 and 59. Additionally, at the time that Defendant Yates made his 22 assertions on or about February 21, 2012, he knew that at no 23 time had he ever addressed most or any of the questions that 24 Plaintiff posed to him in her correspondence of February 8, 2012 25 and that his claim that she had been "fully informed" was 26 nonsensical if he was referring to the issues she had raised in that letter (EXHIBIT 12). 27

82. Plaintiff has been generally and specially damaged in an amount to be determined at trial on the issues herein, and whereas Defendants' acts and omissions were grossly negligent, done fraudulently and with a malicious disregard of her rights, Plaintiff is entitled to recover of them punitive and exemplary damages according to proof at trial.

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SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

CONVERSION AND ACCOUNTING

Against Defendants Yates, Corporation, Ingels, Associates & Does 3-17, inclusive

- 83. Within the Sixth Cause of Action for Conversion and Accounting, Plaintiff reincorporates and re-alleges as though fully set forth herein each and every allegation contained within the preceding paragraphs 1-82, inclusive.
- 84. On or about December 2010, Defendants Yates and Corporation had in their possession funds received from the City of Los Angeles pursuant to a judgment in the underlying court case which were or should have been held in trust for Plaintiff.
 - 85. On or about December 2010, Defendants Yates and Corporation paid funds to Defendants Associates and Ingels from the Plaintiff's trust funds, and potentially to Does 3-17,inclusive, which had not been earned and for which either no services were in fact performed or for which fees had been inflated.
 - 86. Plaintiff is entitled to an accounting to determine the legitimacy or illegitimacy of payments made from Plaintiff's judgment funds, to include but not be limited to proof of services performed, copies of invoices and billings for

- services, and the work product performed for which payments were made.
- 87. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that
 Defendants Yates, Corporation, Ingels, Associates, and Does 3-17
 inclusive have violated and/or conspired to violate Section 506
 of the California Penal Code in doing the acts and omissions

7 | alleged herein.

88. Plaintiff has been damaged by the acts and omissions of the Defendants as alleged herein and brings suit for general and special damages according to proof, and wherein Defendants' acts and omissions were fraudulent, malicious, and done in violation of public policy, Plaintiff is entitled to punitive and exemplary damages according to proof.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

Against Defendants Yates, Corporation, Bavilski and Does 3-8, inclusive

- 89. Within the Seventh Cause of Action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Plaintiff reincorporates and re-alleges as though fully set forth herein each and every allegation contained within the preceding paragraphs 1-88, inclusive.
- 90. By reason of common law, the California Business & Professions Code, Section 6068(e), (m), and (n) and RPC 3-100, 3-110, 3-300, 3-310, 3-500, 3-700, 4-100, and 4-200, the Defendants owed Plaintiff their fiduciary duty, a duty of loyalty, and a duty of reasonable care in the management of her legal affairs, and in the protection of her rights.

- 91. In doing the acts and omissions alleged herein, Defendants
 Yates, Corporation, and Bavilski violated their fiduciary
 duties, their duty of loyalty, and their duty of reasonable care
 to Plaintiff in violation of public policy, and in violation of
- 5 Section 6128 of the California Business & Professions Code.

exemplary damages according to proof.

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92. Plaintiff has been damaged by the acts and omissions of the
Defendants as alleged herein and brings suit for general and
special damages according to proof, and wherein Defendants' acts
and omissions were fraudulent, malicious, and done in violation
of public policy, Plaintiff is entitled to punitive and

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

18 USC 1964 - Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act Against All Defendants

- 93. Within the Seventh Cause of Action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Plaintiff reincorporates and re-alleges as though fully set forth herein each and every allegation contained within the preceding paragraphs 1-88, inclusive.
- 19 94. On about December 8, 2010 Defendants Yates or and Corporation caused to be transmitted by electronic mail (E-mail) 20 Plaintiff 21 an invoice which contained the information 22 described in paragraphs 9-14, inclusive, in violation of 18 USC 23 1343.
- 95. On or about December 20, 2010, Defendants Yates and Corporation caused to be transmitted by electronic mail (E-mail) to Plaintiff an invoice which contained the information described in paragraphs 9-14, inclusive, in violation of 18 USC 1343. (EXHIBIT 14)

96. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendants Ingels and Associates received a payment for services which they did not, in fact, perform in connection with this In accepting and cashing, or depositing, transaction. payment from Defendants Yates and Corporation, Defendants Ingels and Associates violated 18 USC 1956. 95. On or about May 1, 2012, Defendants Ingels and Associates caused to be transmitted to Plaintiff by United States mail a lulling letter" (EXHIBIT 11) in violation of 18 USC 1341. On or about May 16, 2012, Defendants Ingels and Associates caused to be transmitted to Plaintiff by United States mail a "lulling letter" in violation of 18 USC 1341. (EXHIBIT 15) 96. On or about February 21, 2012, via United States mail transmission, Certified Receipt No. 7011-0470-0002-5312-8445, Defendants Yates and Corporation a "lulling letter" as a means of carrying out their continuing fraud against the Plaintiff in violation of 18 USC 1341. (EXHIBIT 13) 97. On or about May 9, 2010, Plaintiff met Defendant Yates at MacArthur Park along with his private investigator, Ken Shigut. Yates came to the park with a man whom he described as being a one-time member of the Mexican Mafia ("La Eme") and told Plaintiff that he (Yates) had assisted him in getting out of Defendant Yates also told Plaintiff at that time that prison. out of sympathy for the man's having been framed into prison by the Los Angeles Police Department, that Defendant Yates had enlisted him and his children into a scheme to falsely claim that two of his children had been in MacArthur Park on May 1, 2007 so that they could get settlement money from a class action

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lawsuit against the City of Los Angeles. On May 9, 2010 at MacArthur Park, private investigator Ken Shigut was observed by Plaintiff to have a handgun concealed under his coat. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Ken Shigut is not licensed or otherwise authorized by the Bureau of Security & Investigative Services to carry a concealed weapon, or any weapon at all, in the course and scope of his duties as a private investigator.

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- 9 98. In doing these acts and omissions Defendant Yates
 10 effectively adopted the role of *consigliere* to a RICO
 11 enterprise.
- 99. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that in doing the acts and omissions alleged in paragraph 44(a) above, that Defendants Yates and Corporation violated, or may have violated 18 USC 1341, 18 USC 1343, 18 USC 1956, and 18 USC 1962.
 - 100. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that in doing the acts and omissions alleged in paragraph 44(d) above, that Defendants Yates and Corporation violated or may have violated 18 USC 1341, 18 USC 1343, 18 USC 1956, and 18 USC 1962.
- 22 | 101. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges 23 | that Defendant Corporation is maintained by Defendant Yates and 24 | by other defendants as a *de facto* RICO enterprise as defined in 25 | 18 USC 1961(4).
- 26 | 102. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges 27 | that Defendant Corporation and the remaining Defendants have 28 | established an association in fact as a RICO enterprise engaged

- 1 in a pattern of racketeering activity as defined in 18 USC 2 | 1961(5).
- 3 | 103. 18 USC 1341, 18 USC 1943 and 18 USC 1956 are predicate
- 4 | acts of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization (R.I.C.O.)
- 5 Act as defined in 18 USC 1961 and 18 USC 1962 is a direct
- 6 | violation of the RICO Act.
- 7 | 104. Plaintiff has suffered injuries to her property interests
- 8 | as a proximate result of the Defendants' RICO predicate acts as
- 9 | alleged herein.
- 10 | 105. Plaintiff is entitled to recover general and special
- 11 damages against the Plaintiffs and each of them on this cause of
- 12 | action, to be trebled, and wherein, the Defendants' acts and
- 13 | omissions were malicious, oppressive, fraudulent and done in
- 14 | violation of public policy, Plaintiff is entitled to recover of
- 15 Defendants punitive and exemplary damages, attorney fees and
- $16 \parallel \text{costs pursuant to } 18 \text{ USC } 1964(c)$.

WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF PRAYS FOR RELIEF AS FOLLOWS:

- For Judgment for Plaintiff and against the Defendants and each of them;
- 20 | For Rescission of the first and second sentences of Clause
- 21 VIII of the Contract at issue herein or in the alternative for
- 22 | Rescission of the Contract in its entirety;
- 23 || For general damages and special damages according to proof on
- 24 | the Second through Eighth Causes of Action, inclusive and to be
- 25 | trebled on the Eighth Cause of Action;
- 26 For punitive and exemplary damages according to proof on the
- 27 | Second and Fifth through Eighth Causes of Action, inclusive;

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1	For Attorney fees according to the Contract (if not rescinded
2	in its entirety) and costs of the suit herein and by statute or
3	the Eighth Cause of Action pursuant to 18 USC 1964(c);
4	For an accounting on the Sixth Cause of Action;
5	For such other and further relief as appropriate.
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10	Patricia Nazario, Plaintiff in pro per
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